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A Transparency Turn in Global Environmental 
Governance 
Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason 
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants.” 
Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1913
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A century after this the epigraph’s enduring insightJustice Louis Brandeis 
uttered these prescient words, we live, seemingly, in an era of transparency. 
Transparency is equated most often with openness and reduced secrecy,  and 
is considered to be the opposite of secrecy, to be securedgarnered through 
greater availability and increased flows of information (Florini 1998; see also 
Fenster 2010). Whether to enhance global security, secure human rights, 
discipline borderless business, or hold to account faceless bureaucrats, 
transparency is increasingly seen as part of the solution to a complex and 
diverse array of economic, political, and ethical challenges in our increasingly 
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interconnected world (Finel and Lord 2000; Fung et al. 2007; Soederberg 
2001). 
Aided and abetted by the rapid diffusion of information-
communication technologies, transparency is implicated in many of the most 
high-profile controversies of our times. These range from the much -
publicized 2010 WikiLleaks disclosures of US diplomatic cables and wartime 
activities, ; to design of “robust” international monitoring, reporting, and 
verification systems for global climate mitigation, ; to calls for transparency to 
combat opaque business practices implicated in the global financial crisis. In 
each of these cases, the benefits sought through transparency include 
empowering the weak and holding accountable the powerful, by reducing 
informational asymmetries between authority holders and affected actors (e.g., 
Grigorescu 2007; Roberts 2004; Stasavage 2003). Transparency is also 
implicated in the pursuit of substantive regulatory outcomes, such as 
environmental improvements, stabilized markets, reduced corruption, or 
enhanced human security (e.g., Weil et al., 2006; Stephan 2002). 
Yet can and does transparency live up to its many promises? A 
growing number of transparency analysts have revealed not only the promise, 
but also the pathologies and limitations associated with the growing uptake of 
transparency by public and private actors across a range of policy areas 
(Bannister and Connolly 2011; Fung et al. 2007; Hood and Heald 2006; Lord 
2006). For example, a requirement under a domestic freedom of information 
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act to disclose minutes of government proceedings may result in minutes not 
being formally recorded, thereby increasing secrecy and hindering 
accountability (Roberts 2006). Debates about the consequences of the wide-
ranging WikiLeaks disclosures support the uneasy conclusion that ever-greater 
openness may not only breed greater secrecy but also have other undesirable 
impacts, such as exacerbating conflict or mistrust (see also Birchall 2011). In 
the same vein, opposition to aggressive US governmental investigation of 
media leaks in 2013 was grounded in the belief that secrecy (in this case, 
maintaining anonymity of journalistic sources) is sometimes a prerequisite for 
the very disclosure that can hold the powerful to account. 
The relationship between transparency and more accountable, 
legitimate, and effective governance is thus far from straightforward. The 
ideal(s) of transparency may be contested or may not be attained in practice. 
Our objective in this volumebook is to scrutinize these ideals and their 
rendering in practice across a diverse set of global governance initiatives. We 
focus, in particular, on the global environmental domain, as a paradigmatic 
case of transparency being embraced as an unmitigated good. In doing so, our 
point of departure is that transparency is becoming a central component of 
global environmental discourse and practice. Our aim in this volumebook is 
thus to identify the configuration of factors fueling such a posited 
“transparency turn” in global environmental governance, as well as its breadth 
and quality, and potential transformative effects. 
Comment [AG1]: Retain italics here pl. 
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We proceed as follows: in the next section, we first address definitional 
issues and specify our focus in this volumebook on “governance by 
disclosure” as symptomatic of a transparency turn in the global environmental 
realm. In the next sectionsection 2, wWe then draw on various theoretical 
traditions in (global) environmental politics scholarship to outline a distinctive 
theoretical approach—critical transparency studies—that informs the analyses 
in this volumebook. The finalnext sectionSection 3 draws on this perspective 
to outline an analytical framework to assess the uptake, institutionalization, 
and effects of transparency in global environmental governance. We identify a 
set of overarching questions and hypotheses with which the empirical chapters 
engage. We conclude with an overview of contributions and a summary of key 
findings. 
Conceptualizing Transparency as Governance by 
Disclosure 
In a most general sense, transparency is associated with openness, 
communication, the opposite of secrecy, and information flows. Yet there are 
few widely accepted definitions of the term, and it is often conflated in 
scholarly writings with related notions such as accountability or publicity (on 
the latter, see Gilbert 2007). Scholarly reactions to this definitional diversity 
range from lamenting the lack of a shared definition (e.g., Etzioni 2010; 
Seidman 20102011); ), to unpacking the normative and political underpinnings 
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of specific understandings of transparency (e.g., Birchall 2011); ), to  
developing typologies and taxonomies of the concept as a way to clarify its 
scope and meaning (e.g., Heald 2006; Mitchell 2011). 
Our point of departure in this volumebook is that different 
understandings framings of transparency by different actors in diverse 
contexts itself merits critical scrutiny and explanation, rather than being a 
conceptual flaw or practical failure to be remedied (see also Langley 2001). 
Etymologically, transparency connotes rendering visible or seeing through 
(Michener and Bersch 2011). An association of transparency with visibility 
leaves aside, however, its relational and normative dimensions, such as what is 
to be made visible, by whom, and for whom; the desired quality and/or 
quantity of transparency; and the (governance) effects expected to flow from 
it. Our aim in this volumebook is to further understanding of such relational 
and normative aspects of transparency, including how such aspects are 
differently framed and institutionalized in specific instances, and with what 
consequences for the processes and outcomes of global environmental 
governance. 
It is important to note at the outset that our study of transparency is 
both broader and narrower in scope than specific lay usages of the term might 
suggest. First, transparency tends to be associated, in common parlance, with 
governments disclosing information to interested publics. We go beyond this 
narrow understanding of (the scope of) transparency in this volumebook. In 
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line with the changing dynamics of multilevel and multi-actor global 
governance, our point of departure is that transparency is being deployed in a 
much broader context than that of states being transparent to their domestic 
publics or even, in a global context, to other states. Our focus here is rather on 
the multiple instigators, architects, and recipients of transparency in global 
governance, going beyond states to include corporations, civil society groups, 
international organizations, consumers, and citizens (see also Langley 2001). 
As Michener and Bersch (2011, 5) have observed, both the demand and supply 
of transparency is now “multidirectional.” 
At the same time, given our interest in governance, we focus here on a 
specific manifestation of a transparency turn in global politics: the reliance on 
targeted disclosure of information as a means by which to evaluate and steer 
behavior, that is, as a means by which to govern. We refer to this phenomenon 
as “governance by disclosure” (Gupta 2008) by which we understand public 
and private governance initiatives that employ targeted disclosure of 
information as a way to evaluate and/or steer the behavior of selected actors. 
We view the proliferation of governance by disclosure initiatives in the global 
environmental domain as clearly reflective of a transparency turn in this realm. 
Our focus on governance by disclosure permits a manageable delimitation of 
the scope of this study, even as it allows forenables a systematic comparison 
of the uptake and effects of transparency across a range of public and private 





We select the global environmental policy domain for two reasons. 
The first is that a wide array ofmultiple state and non-state actors are isare now 
increasingly embracing transparency as a necessary feature of decision- 
making and regulatory action to address global environmental challenges. 
Diverse actors champion transparency as a means to enhance efficiency, 
accountability, or and effectiveness of global environmental governance, a 
phenomenon that we believe deserves a comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical examination. The normative rationales underpinning a 
multidirectional embrace of transparency in this realm are also diverse. Thus, 
private actors may promote transparency as a voluntary means by which to 
further corporate sustainability goals, and perhaps thereby to avoid mandatory 
regulation. In By contrast, public actors and civil society may promote 
transparency as a way to correct perceived democratic deficits in 
environmental decision- making, or ensure informed choice in risk and 
sustainability governance. These multiple (and often opposing) rationales for 
transparency thus may include extending the reach of the state in order to 
enhance effectiveness of state-led policy, or scaling back the state in 
advocating for voluntary private governance. Similarly, transparency may be 
deployed to further a morally grounded ‘right to know’ know in order to hold 
government or private actors accountable, or as a means to facilitate individual 
lifestyle choices and market-based solutions to sustainability (Langley 2001; 
Mason 2008b). 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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Notwithstanding the diverse architects of transparency and the diverse 
rationales to embrace it, a common underlying presumption underpinning 
“governance by disclosure” is that transparency matters; yet, a systematic 
analysis of how, under what conditions, and for whom remains to be done. 
Despite the increasing importance of transparency in global environmental 
governance, the concept remains surprisingly little scrutinized in this field (but 
see Langley 2001 and Mitchell 1998 for important exceptions). This is in 
contrast to, for example, international financial and economic relations, global 
security, human rights, or and diplomacy, where in which transparency studies 
have a longer and more established trajectory (e.g., Graham 2002; Grigorescu 
2007; Lord 2006; Roberts 2004; Stasavage 2003). 
This lack of attention to transparency is the second reason we select the 
global environmental realm as our focus. Even as transparency, as such, has 
received less attention here, closely related concepts such as information and 
(scientific) knowledge have long enjoyed pride of place in scholarly analyses 
in global environmental politics from diverse theoretical perspectives (e.g., 
Gupta 2006; Haas 1989; Litfin 1994; Mitchell et al. 2006). Transparency is 
intimately related to these fields of inquiry, but appears to have fallen between 
the cracks of their core analytical concerns. This holds as well for analyses of 
legitimate and democratic global environmental governance that routinely 
evoke the link to transparency (e.g., Bernstein 2001; Dryzek 1999; Keohane 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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2006). This, yet this link, however, remains more stated than scrutinized (but 
see Dingwerth 2007). 
The recently launched international research program on “Earth 
System Governance” emphasizes as well a need to examine such posited 
relationships. Earth system governance is defined in this global research 
program as “the interrelated… . . . system of formal and informal rules, rule-
making mechanisms and actor-networks at all levels of human society (from 
local to global) that are set up to steer societies towards preventing, mitigating 
and adapting to … . . . environmental change and earth system transformation” 
(Biermann et al. 2010, p. 279). Accountability (including its relationship to 
transparency) is identified here as one of the five core analytical challenges of 
earth system governance research, and one that has been relatively less studied 
(Biermann and Gupta 2011; Mason 2008a). 
We address transparency in global environmental governance in this 
volumebook by bringing together three conceptual overview articles and ten 
in-depth empirical analyses ofanalyzing both state-led and private disclosure 
initiatives in the global environmental realm. The rationale to include both 
public and privately fueled disclosure is to reflect on the multidirectional 
nature and consequences of the transparency turn in this the global 
environmental realm. The environmental issues covered include climate 
change, deforestation, marine pollution, access to, and benefit sharing 
fromsustainable use of genetic resources, technological and chemical risk 
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reduction, safe trade in genetically modified organisms, sustainable natural 
resource extraction,  safe trade in hazardous chemicals,  reducing reduced 
environmental harm from foreign direct investment, and improving improved 
corporate sustainability performance. Such a wide-ranging and comparative 
analysis of diverse disclosure-based governance in the global environmental 
realm has not yet been undertaken, making this the first volumebook to do so. 
Prior to outlining an analytical framework for this comparative 
assessment, we first advance below in the following sectionWe turn next to 
the critical transparency studies perspective that informs our analysis of 
governance by disclosure in this volumebook. 
A Critical Transparency Studies Perspective 
Multiple writings on transparency in various the social sciences fields yield a 
range of insights regarding the uptake and effectiveness of transparency-based 
governance. Transparency has been analyzed at some length in national-level 
(environmental) policy analyses, where it has received significantly more 
attention than in a global context. This body of work has extended the frontiers 
of transparency scholarship under the rubric of what it terms “regulation by 
revelation” as a third wave of domestic environmental rule- making since the 
late 1990s (Florini 1998). According to this literature, a third wave of 
disclosure-based regulation has been stimulated by the ineffectiveness and 
implementation gaps dogging the first (command -and -control) and second 
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(market-based) waves of national environmental policy making (Fung et al., 
2007; Graham 2002; Konar and Cohen 1997; Stephan 2002). 
In one of the most extensive analyses, Fung and colleagues examine 
the conditions under which what they call “targeted transparency” (i.e., 
disclosure of specific types of information, in contrast to a more general right 
to know) can be effective. Through detailed comparative analyses of various 
national-level, and to lesser extent, global transparency policies, they find that 
effective transparency requires disclosed information to become embedded in 
the decision-making processes of both disclosers and recipients. This, they 
note, is difficult to obtain in practice, ensuring that transparency often falls 
short of meeting its desired aims (see also Weil et al., 2013). 
These studies are important precursors to our analysis of “governance 
by disclosure” in a global environmental context. They have tended, however, 
to be more or less aligned with a dominant liberal institutionalist perspective 
on the role of information and power in global environmental governance 
scholarship. Such a perspective holds that openness, communication, 
reporting, and information exchange can aid in more effective global 
environmental governance, by correcting for information asymmetries 
between the powerful and those seeking to hold them to account, and/or by 
facilitating more evidence-based, rational decision- making (see, for example, 
Esty 2003; Mitchell 1998 and, 2011). 
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Analyses informed by this approach have been very useful in 
highlighting highlighted the promise, but and also the many dysfunctionalities 
of disclosure-based governance, which may impede its potential to empower, 
hold governors to account, or further specific regulatory aims. Such 
dysfunctionalities can include disclosure of incomplete or unreliable data; lack 
of comparability, comprehensibility, or accessibility of disclosed data; and a 
lack of capacity on the part of recipients to interpret and use disclosed data 
(Fung et al. 2007; Graham 2002; Weil et al. 2006). While Although these are 
important insights into the hurdles  to the effective functioning of 
disclosurefacing governance by disclosure, transparency analyses from a 
liberal institutionalist perspective on transparency tendss to attribute lack of 
effective disclosure to such inadequacies of institutional design or bureaucratic 
capacity, to a lack of attainability of “full disclosure” (Fung et al. 2007), or to 
the fact that transparency not having has not proceeded “far enough, fast 
enough” (e.g., Florini 2007). 
In By contrast, our point of departure in this volumebook is that 
transparency’s uptake and effects can only be understood only within the 
broader, often contested, normative, and political context within which 
disclosure is being deployed. We adopt a critical perspective on transparency 
here that analyzes disclosure as a site of political conflict, and hence 
transparency itself as fundamentally contested political terrain. We label this a 
critical transparency studies perspective, by which we mean approaches that 
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(i1) problematize transparency and governance by disclosure; , (ii2) account 
for the historicity and socio-political embedding of transparency and 
disclosure practices; , and (iii3) acknowledge the unavoidable normativity 
(value-laden structure) of transparency and disclosure. In developing this 
perspective, we draw on theoretical groundwork laid by constructivist and 
critical political economy approaches in global environmental politics 
scholarship. 
Constructivist analyses of science, knowledge, and information have 
long highlighted the changing authority and accountability relationships 
around the generation and sharing of (scientific) information in governing 
environmental challenges. As such, this strand of scholarship is particularly 
relevant to studies of governance by disclosure. As writings in this vein 
suggest, current global environmental challenges, such as climate change or 
safe use of biotechnology, are characterized by fundamental normative 
conflicts and scientific uncertainties over what is valid knowledge and whose 
information counts. If so, agreeing on what is “more and better” information, 
that is, on the scope and quality of information, is inevitably a matter of 
political conflict (Jasanoff 2004; Litftin 1994; see also Gupta 2006 and, 2008). 
As Fischer (2009, 185) notes, even environmental information presented as 
technical is shaped by the situational and social-opolitical contexts of its 
production, dissemination, and reception. Furthermore, as science acquires 
ever- greater prominence as a source of authority in global environmental 





governance (Gupta et al. 2012), the imperative to disclose scientific data and 
knowledge- generation processes also increases. This implies that political 
conflicts over valid knowledge shape the contours of governance by disclosure 
as well. 
Drawing on these insights, a critical transparency studies perspective 
holds that the effects of transparency in the global environmental realm will 
turn not so much on reducing information asymmetries in order to promote 
more rational outcomes, but rather on whose information counts and is 
accorded primacy in environmental decision- making and governance. It 
postulates, furthermore, that the very processes of negotiating the scope and 
practices of disclosure serves to selectively frame, and hence constitute, the 
object of governance (see, for e.g.example, Jasanoff 2004; Lövbrand 2011). 
Critical political economy perspectives in global environmental 
scholarship (e.g., Clapp 2007; Clapp and Helleiner 2012; Levy and Newell 
2005; Newell 2008a and, 2008b) inform our thinking here as well. Such 
perspectives build on influential early analyses of the sources and location of 
power in international politics (Strange 1988, 1996) to more recent studies of 
the of (distinct and unequally distributed forms of)  of public and private 
power authority and vulnerabilities in shapingthat shape global environmental 
governance (e.g., Fuchs 2005). 
Such research emphasizes, for example, the current (unstable) 
dominance in global environmental governance of what Steven Bernstein 
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(2001) labels “liberal environmentalism”—an authoritative complex of norms 
that frames environmental governance challenges according to market liberal 
values and interests. The institutionalization of liberal environmentalism may 
legitimate legitimize governance practices and further ecological goals insofar 
as these do not challenge underlying structures of market or political power. 
In line with this, a critical transparency perspective holds that 
transparency’s uptake and effects in global environmental governance need to 
be understood within this broader (unequal) political economic context, one in 
which private actors, furthermore, are likely to have a major role in shaping 
and deploying public modes of information disclosure. Insofar as liberal 
environmentalism has political and policy currency, transparency, if adopted, 
is likely to have minimal market-restricting effects, and may be skewed by 
state economic development or corporate interests. 
Such a perspective allows that transparency may reproduce rather than 
disrupt socially and ecologically harmful concentrations of public and private 
power. It is of particular relevance to an analysis of transparency in a global 
context, characterized by North–-South disparities in the power and capacity 
to demand disclosure, and to access and use disclosed information. It may help 
to explain, as well, a potential paradox of the transparency turn in global 
politics: that the desired quality and quantity of disclosed information (such as 
its breadth, comparability, comprehensibility, comprehensiveness, or 
accessibility) may follow from rather than precipitate changes in the broader 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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normative and political context. Thus, greater levels of “actionable” 
transparency may only be obtainable only after broader democratic, 
participatory, and environmental gains have been secured in a given context , 
rather than precipitating such gains (Gupta 2010b2010a). 
This leaves open a fundamental question: is transparency 
epiphenomenal? Even as transparency becomes ubiquitous in global 
environmental governance, its transformative potential remains uncertain and 
contingent. From a critical transparency studies perspective, we can identify a 
continuum of views—ranging from the more skeptical to the more 
pragmatic—on the transformative potential of transparency, each of which is 
present, to greater or lesser extent, in the contributions to this volumebook. 
From a more skeptical perspective, there is little hope for transparency 
to transform entrenched structural imbalances of power or unequal life and 
livelihood options (for a similar view, in the case of global peace and security, 
see Lord 2006). Such a perspective would characterize transparency as, for 
example, a “red herring” of modern political culture (Brown 2002, 1). As 
Brown argues, one response to a perceived crisis of trust in dominant 
governance institutions is a demand for greater transparency to foster and 
hence greater trust in both public and private decision-making processes and 
outcomes. A widespread assumption is that transparency can build trust, yet 
transparency as an antidote to a crisis of trust is failing (but see also O’Neill 
2006). As . O’Neill argues, this is because disclosure is not embedded in “the 
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epistemic and ethical norms required for successful communicative acts” 
(O’Neill 2006, 81). Brown argues, however, that this is unlikely because 
“…the causes of mistrust have nothing to do with how much or how little 
information is made available” (2002, 1). TTransparency, from this 
perspective, , from this perspective, mirrors insteads instead the broader meta-
normative and political economic conflicts that shape global governance, and 
hence can only acquire meaning and relevance in such a context (see, for 
e.g.example, in this volumebook, Mason, chapter 4; Gupta, chapter 6; Gupta et 
al., chapter 8; and Knox-Hayes and Levy, chapter 9). Its Transparency’s 
transformative potential, particularly if understood as structural change, thus 
remains severely attenuated. 
A more pragmatic perspective emphasizes that, while although 
transparency is no panacea, context-specific incremental gains in 
empowerment, accountability, and environmental improvements are feasible 
and attainable (see, for e.g.example, in this volumebook, Jansen and Dubois, 
chapter 5; Orsini et al., chapter 7; Dingwerth and Eichinger, chapter 10; and 
Auld and Gulbrandsen, chapter 12). In such a perspective, disclosure may be 
viewed as a default option or as “the only game in town,” given the difficulties 
of negotiating more far-reaching or costly regulatory options in contested 
issue- areas (Haufler 2010). Even as a default option, however, it need not be 
lacking in empowerment or effectiveness potential (e.g., Van Alstine, chapter 
11; and Ehresman and Stevis, chapter 13). Some scholars in this tradition 
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claim as well that transparency can deliver governance gains, but only under 
relatively demanding conditions that may not obviate the need for other 
regulatory tools (e.g., Etzioni 2010). 
Going further, and most optimistic about transparency’s transformative 
potential, are critical perspectives that nonetheless emphasize that 
transparency’s engagement with the institutions and practices of power is 
more dialectical, that is, shaped by but also able to shape in turn the dominant 
norms and practices of global governance (e.g., Florini and Jairaj, this 
volumebook, chapter 3; see also Picciotto 2000). In line with this, Mol (2006 
and, 2008) observes, for example, that information provides a resource for 
political transformation, as a growing constitutive element of environmental 
governance—what he labels informational governance (see also Mol, this 
volumebook, chapter 2). 
The above previousforegoing discussion reveals that, even from within 
a broadly critical transparency studies perspective, the prospects for, and 
nature of, transformative effects of transparency’s transformative potential is 
are  differently understood and framed, and can range from structural to 
incremental change. What the transformative effects of transparency might 
consist of remainsis, then, an a context-specific empirical question. As we 
elaborate belowin the following, we argue nonetheless that only by assessing a 
broad range of governance ends—normative, procedural, and substantive—
can we capture the difference that transparency makes in particular contexts.  
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We turn next to our analytical framework to study governance by 
disclosure, which runs through the cases in this book. In advancing this 
framework, we suggest that only by assessing a broad range of governance 
ends—normative, procedural, and substantive—can we capture the difference 
that transparency makes in particular contexts. 
Governance by Disclosure: An Analytical Framework 
We bring the our critical transparency studies perspective previously outlined 
above to bear on the central concerns of this volumebook, relating to the 
nature and implications of a multidirectional transparency turn in global 
environmental governance. We do so by outlining an analytical framework 
here that specifies a set of research questions and hypotheses relating to three 
aspects of governance by disclosure: its uptake, institutionalization, and 
effects. The empirical chapters then explore in-depth these three aspects. 
Uptake of Transparency: Drivers of Disclosure 
In line with our aim to historicize and contextualize the role of transparency in 
global environmental governance, the first element of our analytical 
framework relates to explaining the uptake of transparency in a given issue-  
area. All empirical contributions thus analyze the question,: why transparency 
now? In posing this question, we draw on the existing state of the art in 
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transparency studies to hypothesize about possible drivers of transparency’s 
uptake in global governance. 
A growing body of literature suggests, first, that a rights-based 
democratic push for individual liberty, choice, and participation is driving a 
growing embrace of transparency in global politics (Florini 2008; Graham 
2002; Gupta 2008; Mason 2008b). We label this a democratization driver, 
insofar as democratic forms of governance seem to require more open and 
inclusive forms of collective choice. 
A democratization driver of transparency is seen to underpin, for 
example, the spread of the “right -to -know” and freedom -of- information 
laws in multiple national contexts over the last quarter centurysince at least the 
1980s (Florini 2007; see also Florini and Jairaj, this volumebook, chapter 3). 
This has now evolved, however, into a broader association of transparency 
with securing multidirectional accountability, and a more legitimate and 
democratic global polity (e.g., Bernstein 2005; Dingwerth 2005; Keohane 
2003). 
Those positing such relationships assume that disclosure of relevant 
information is often a necessary step in holding actors to account for their (in)-
actions according to set environmental standards. A reasonable expectation is 
that, insofar as information is disclosed by those responsible for decisions that 
significantly affect the interests of others, such disclosure will facilitate 
individual and institutional answerability or even change. However, this 
Formatted: Font: Not Bold, Italic
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involves assumptions about the capacity and responsiveness of particular 
actors, as well asand the political systems within which they operate (Fox 
2007); ), including the assumption that democratic institutions foster greater 
accountability for environmental harm. 
An empirical question for this volumebook as a whole is thus the 
extent to which the democratic rationale for transparency is significant for the 
environmental governance initiatives studied, and if so, whether it is 
necessarily liberal democratic: we return to this in our conclusion. While 
Although there is a substantial literature on the relationship between 
democratic decision-making processes and ecological sustainability, much of 
it informed by theories of deliberative democracy (e.g., Baber and Bartlett 
2005; Bäckstrand et al. 2010; Dryzek 2000; Dryzek and Stevenson 2011;  
Paehlke 2003; Smith 2003), the relationship between democratization and the 
uptake of transparency remains much less examined. 
Included in a democratizing imperative for disclosure is an increasing 
pressure to democratize science and expertise as well, which is of particular 
relevance to the global environmental realm. As we noted abovepreviously, an 
ever-growing role for science is evident in global environmental governance, 
insofar as the framing of cause and effect of global environmental challenges 
are is increasingly influenced by expert bodies (Mitchell et al. 2006; Moore et 
al. 2011). As Ulrich Beck notes in Risk Society, it is a paradox of our times 
that the most politically and scientifically contested environmental and risk 
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governance challenges, where whenthose where the authority of science is 
most likely to be questioned, are also those the issue-areas that most need 
scientific input (Beck 1992). This intensifies the need to subject scientific 
processes of knowledge generation to greater public scrutiny and engagement 
(see also Jasanoff 2003a and, 2003b). 
Much writing on the science-policy interfacethe need to democratize 
science in the environmental realm focuses, as a result, on the institutional and 
normative challenges of designing participatory and inclusive processes of 
knowledge generation and validation, as a way to democratize science (e.g., 
Leach et al. 2007; Lövbrand et al. 20102011). Our point of departureinterest 
here rather is in how that disclosure of knowledge- generation processes and 
expert data is an equally important element implicated in the push to 
democratize science. democratizing the science-policy interface. 
In sum, as a first driver of disclosure, we hypothesize that a 
multifaceted democratization imperative (including calls to democratize 
science) is driving transparency’s the uptake of transparency in global 
environmental governance.  
Tensions arise, however, from the fact that efforts to improve the 
democratic quality of (global) environmental governance, by embracing 
information disclosure, often go hand-in-hand with a neoliberal privileging of 
market-based solutions to global sustainability challenges, and “light touch” 
regulation of the private sector (Moore et al. 2011; Bernstein 2001). This can, 
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in turn, stimulate an uptake of market-based and voluntary transparency, often 
as a way to avoid more stringent, mandatory, or costly governance options (on 
this point, see also Haufler 2010). 
In line with this, we posit marketization to be a second driver of 
transparency’s uptake in global environmental governance. In contrast to a 
democratization imperative for disclosure, a neoliberal market-driven uptake 
of transparency may seek to minimize the scope of (potentially market-
restricting) disclosure, and exempt corporate actors from stringent disclosure 
(Florini 2008; Haufler 2010). Alternatively, however, disclosure of (certain 
types of) information might well be seen as essential to the establishment and 
functioning of newly created markets in environmental goods and services, 
such as those for carbon or genetic resources. In such cases, transparency 
might be promoted by powerful actors, such as corporations and policy elites, 
as desirable and necessary in order to create and facilitate markets, rather than 
being perceived as a regulatory burden that can restrict markets. a threat in its 
potential to restrict markets (in, for example, environmentally harmful 
products). 
An empirical question we address is thus whether (and what kind of) 
marketization imperative drives uptake of transparency in global 
environmental governance. In addressing this, we are also interested in 
whether a marketization rationale for disclosure facilitates, follows, or restricts 
markets. 
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Our discussion above yields a general hypothesis (H1) that all 
empirical chapters engage with, in addressing “why transparency now” for 
their case: that democratization and marketization are driving uptake of 
transparency in global environmental governance. More broadly, the 
theoretical and empirical task we set ourselves, both individually and 
collectively, is to analyze how these drivers of disclosure may intersect with 
each other and the conditions under which one or the other may dominate. 
A logical next question is how specific drivers of disclosure shape the 
manner in which transparency is institutionalized and how it functions in 
practice. We turn next to this second element of our analytical framework. 
Institutionalizing Transparency: Scope and Modalities 
The second element component of our analytical framework—and second 
question addressed by all contributions—relates to how transparency is being 
institutionalized in a given issue- area. By institutionalization, we refer to 
specific configurations of the scope and modalities of disclosure in a given 
caseinstances. 
One much- debated aspect of institutionalization relates to the quantity 
of disclosed information that is provided. Much scholarly and policy attention 
in mainstream transparency studies has focused on the desirability of—and 
challenges facing—complete or “full” disclosure. In the policy realms of 
international finance, security, and diplomacy, an oft-posed question turns on 
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whether full disclosure is feasible and/or desirable. Most analyses conclude 
that complete disclosure in such areas is both unattainable and undesirable, 
given the merits of retaining varying degrees of secrecy, anonymity, or 
privacy in many instances (e.g., Birchall 2011; Lord 2006). 
This raises, however, an intriguing question: is the (global) 
environmental realm distinct? The imperative to balance transparency with 
secrecy, privacy, and anonymity may not hold in this policy domain to the 
extent that it does in others, yet this eventuality has not been systematically 
analyzed. What specific features of global environmental governance 
challenges might either impede full disclosure, or make its pursuit more or less 
desirable? Impediments to full disclosure in this realm may relate, among 
others, to corporate confidentiality concerns or proprietary ownership of 
environmental information (see, for example, Orsini et al., this volumebook, 
chapter 7); or to scientific uncertainties and unknowabilities in governing 
complex (transboundary) environmental challenges. It may also relate to the 
materiality of the environmental resource in question, whereby the physical 
properties of, for example, carbon, genetic resources, oil, or forests—and their 
location in wider circuits of material production and consumption—will shape 
the scope of disclosure obtainable in a given context. An empirical question 
task for this volumebook is thus to examine the limits of full disclosure, and 
the merits and demerits of partial transparency in global environmental 
governance, given the geopolitical and material contexts for disclosure. 
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Turning from quantity to quality of disclosed information, much 
scholarly and policy attention has focused, as well, on desired attributes of 
disclosed information as central to the success of transparency-based 
governance. These attributes include disclosed information being (perceived 
as) accessible, comprehensible, comparable, accurate, or relevant (Dingwerth 
and Eichinger 2010), and whether it is standardized or non-standardized. 
Such attributes of disclosure may make transparency more or less 
actionable,  i.e.that is, usable by recipients to further their desired ends (e.g., 
Fung et al. 2007; Michener and Bersch 2011; see also Dingwerth and 
Eichinger, this volumebook, chapter 10). Non-actionable transparency can 
result not only from the scope of disclosure being limited, but also from 
“drowning in disclosure” when too much (or “irrelevant”) information is 
provided (Gupta 2008, 4). An empirical question task for the volumebook is 
thus also thus to consider whether and why (or why not) the desiredto analyze 
attributes of actionable disclosure are obtained in practice. 
In securing actionability of disclosureinstitutionalizing disclosure, an 
increasingly important development in transparency politics is the rise of 
information intermediaries or infrastructures that seek to validate or increase 
the utility of disclosed information for specific stakeholders (Etzioni 2010; 
Fung et al. 2007, Graham 2002, Gupta 2008; Lord 2006). These include 
auditors and verifiers of disclosed information, or civil society groups seeking 
to render disclosed information more user-friendly (see also Langley 2001 for 




an early and detailed discussion of this). Such new transparency 
“powerbrokers” may produce shifts in the loci of authority and expertise in 
environmental governance that shape how disclosure will be 
institutionalizedare also important to examine. 
In sum, this second step component of our analytical framework calls 
for examining, individually and collectively, the scope, quantity, and attributes 
of disclosed information, and whether and how transparency’s intermediaries 
enhance the “actionability” of disclosure for diverse actors.. In line with our 
critical transparency studies perspective, we view the hurdles to securing 
actionable disclosure as going beyond inappropriate design of disclosure 
systems or bureaucratic incapacities to transparency’s embeddedness in 
broader political-economic and geopolitical contexts. In assessing these 
dynamics, we propose a second hypothesis (H2) to be examined by 
contributions to this book: that institutionalization of transparency decenters 
state-led regulation and opens up political space for new actors. 
In assessing the institutionalization of transparency as previously 
outlined above, an overarching concern for this volumebook is whether 
transparency-based arrangements reconfigure public and private authority to 
govern specific environmental issue- areas. Our analytical concern with 
shifting sites of authority in governance This hypothesis derives from a 
prominent view in transparency analyses that private actors and civil society 
are crucial agents in institutionalizing disclosure-based governance, 
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particularly in a neoliberal environmental context (e.g., Langley 2001; Mol 
2006). As such, it permits detailed comparative analysis of whether 
transparency-based arrangements, including their scope and modalities, 
reconfigure public and private authority to govern specific environmental 
issue areas.  
Our analytical concern with shifting sites of authority in governanceIt 
also stems from writings that emphasize a changing role for the state in newer 
modalities of (global environmental) governance (e.g., Eckersley 2004; 
Strange 1988 and, 1996; for a more recent assessment, see Campagnon 
Compagnon et al. 2012).  
In assessing the relevance of broader debates about public/-private 
authority for governance by disclosure, we propose a second hypothesis (H2) 
here to be examined by contributions to this volumebook: that 
institutionalization of transparency de-centers state-led regulation and opens 
up political space for new actors. For instance, institutionalized disclosure 
may qualify state sovereign authority, if it facilitates the generation and 
dissemination of streams of information beyond the legal and epistemic 
control of governments. This may result in a shift away from state-led 
regulation, even as it opens up political space for other actors (on this point, 
see also Mol, this volumebook, chapter 2). 
With regard to the first part of the hypothesis relating toIn 
hypothesizing a potential a de-centering of state-led regulation, we do not 




consider “states” to be a homogenous category. Instead, we are interested in 
whose sovereign authority may be impacted affected through institutionalized 
disclosure. We assume that this will vary across developed versus developing 
countries or emerging economies versus so-called “failed states” (on the 
changing role of different types of states in global ([environmental) ] 
governance, see Campagnon Compagnon et al. 2012).  
Taken as a whole, our aim in postulating this hypothesis is to assess the 
multidirectional nature of transparency’s demand and supply, and the evolving 
roles of state and non-state actors in institutionalizing disclosure.  
The second half of H2, positing that institutionalized disclosure opens 
up political space for other (non-state) actors, stems, as we previously noted 
above, from the current multidirectional nature of transparency’s demand and 
supply, and new functions that non-state actors play as transparency 
intermediaries in institutionalizing disclosure (e.g., Langley 2001). This 
potential consequence of institutionalized disclosure merits comparative 
scrutiny as well. 
With this, wWe turn next to the third element of our analytical 
framework, the effectiveness of governance by disclosure. 
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Effects of Transparency: Normative, Procedural, and 
Substantive 
The third and final component of our analytical framework—and third 
question addressed by all contributions in this volumebook—relates to the 
effects of transparency. Transparency, as we noted at the outset, is associated 
with more accountable, democratic, and/or effective governance. Our third 
strand of inquiry focuses on whether governance by disclosure furthers these 
diverse aims. We are interested thus in assessing the effectiveness of 
governance by disclosure. 
Assessing effectiveness of (global) environmental policies is a long-
standing concern in scholarly research and political practice, with 
effectiveness most often conceptualized as reduced environmental harm 
(Mitchell 1998; Young 1999). A prominent typology here is the “output, 
outcome, impact” distinction in effectiveness research, which seeks to 
distinguish different aspects and stages of policy effectiveness, but retains a 
dominant ultimate concern with environmental improvements (EEA 2001). 
Governance by disclosure, however, seeks to further a broader set of 
governance ends, requiring an analytical openness to a variety of effects. 
These go beyond environmental gains to include a right to know and enhanced 
accountability and inclusiveness of decision-making processes. Such broader 
effects are captured, at least partially, in another long-standing distinction in 
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effectiveness analysis;: that between input and output legitimacy. Scharpf 
(1997) developed this distinction to assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
European decision-making processes and outcomes. By input legitimacy, he 
referred to legitimacy conferred on the rule-setting process by virtue of its 
procedural characteristics (such as how open and inclusive it is). By output 
legitimacy, he referred to legitimacy garnered through the (perceived) ability 
of governance processes and outcomes to effectively address the underlying 
environmental problem. Output legitimacy is thus akin to environmental 
effectiveness, yet with an important difference: it assesses perceived 
effectiveness among stakeholders rather than actual reductions in 
environmental harm or improvements in environmental quality. It thus 
circumvents a key causality challenge facing analyses of environmental 
effectiveness, that of ascertaining direct and indirect causal pathways between 
governance measures and environmental improvements (see also Dingwerth 
2005 and, 2007). 
We build on these various conceptions of effectiveness in our 
analytical framework, but adapt them to capture the diversity of governance 
aims associated with transparency. Specifically, we propose a typology of 
three categories of effects expected from governance by disclosure: normative, 
procedural, and substantive effects. This typology builds on the different ways 
in which transparency is conceptualized in multidisciplinary writings, 
including as a norm, a procedural principle, and/or as a mechanism of 
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governance. These diverse ways of conceptualizing transparency give rise, in 
our view, to an associated set of aims pursued by governance by disclosure. 
These include a normative right to know of information recipients; , 
procedural aims of holding the powerful to account, and/or securing enhanced 
choice or voice in environmental governance processes; , and substantive aims 
of improving environmental performance or reducing harm. 
Such a typology of effectiveness permits enables us to engage also 
with a long-standing debate in global environmental governance, that relating 
to synergies or trade-offs between legitimacy of global environmental 
governance processes, secured through enhanced participation or voice in 
decision- making, and effectiveness in delivering desired environmental 
improvements (e.g., Andresen and Hey 2005; Bäckstrand 2006; Bernstein 
2005). Our assessment of procedural and substantive effects of disclosure in 
this volumebook permits enables us to assess linkages or trade-offs between 
these governance ends. We elaborate further on our typology of effects 
belowin the following section. 
Normative effects 
Underlying an embrace of transparency in governance is often the normative 
belief that those exposed to potential harm have a right to know about 
damaging environmental behaviors or products (Beierle 2004; RowenRowan-
Robinson et al. 1996). Such a moral “right to know” is then a first-order 
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normative goal that governance by disclosure may seek to further. Analyzing 
whether this goal is being met requires analyzing, among othersfor example, 
who is pushing for a right to know; , whether such a right is contested; , how it 
is being institutionalized, and how it is functioning. Such an analysis can shed 
light on the normative effectiveness of governance by disclosure—i.e.that is, 
the consensual strength and currency of a right to know in a given governance 
realm and the extent to which this right is institutionalized and furthered. 
In short, the question we collectively address relating to normative 
effects is whether transparency informs (and if so, whom, and under what 
conditions). 
Procedural effects 
Going beyond a right to know are a range of important procedural aims 
associated with transparency. In political theory and legal analysis, 
transparency is typically linked to empowerment, understood as enhanced 
prospects for more participatory, accountable, and legitimate global 
governance (e.g., van den Burg 2004; Graham 2002; Keohane 2006; Pattberg 
and Enechi 2009; Rose-Ackermann and Halpaap 2002; Stasavage 2003; van 
den Burg 2004). These desired effects of disclosure are closely linked to the 
democratization driver for uptake of transparency, discussed earlierpreviously. 
In assessing the procedural effectiveness of governance by disclosure, 
we explore here the assumed link between transparency and empowerment, 
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and in so doing, further the research agenda on how empowerment is being 
conceptualized and realized (or not) in disclosure-based global governance. In 
order to do so, we assess, for example, links between transparency and 
participation in decision- making (e.g., Auld and Gulbrandsen, this 
volumebook, chapter 1112); and transparency and informed choice (e.g., 
Jansen and Dubois, this volumebook, chapter 5; Gupta, this volumebook, 
chapter 6; and Orsini et al., this volumebook, chapter 7). 
In addition, the posited relationship between transparency and 
accountability is also central to procedural effectiveness. In a global 
governance context, accountability mechanisms are necessarily distinct from 
electoral accountability or constitutional representation, mechanisms that serve 
this function in a national context (Keohane 2003 and, 2006). Ensuring 
accountability of global environmental processes and outcomes, and of 
transnational private governance, is much more challenging (Biermann and 
Gupta 2011; Kingsbury 2007; Mason 2008a). Transparency is, however, one 
of the most oft-evoked mechanisms of securing accountability, even as the 
specific nature and validity of this posited relationship has been very relatively 
little studied (but for one of the fewa comprehensive attempts, see Fox 2007). 
In discussing the distinct nature of accountability in a global 
governance context, Keohane (2003, 141) for example distinguishes between 
internal and external accountability. In internal accountability, the “principal 
and agent are institutionally linked to each other” whereas in external 
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accountability, those whose lives are impacted affected and hence who would 
desire to hold to account, are not directly (or institutionally) linked to the one 
to be held to account. How might transparency play a role in furthering 
internal and external accountability? Is one prioritized over the other, and what 
scope and modalities of disclosure are suitable to each? We make a start in this 
volumebook in addressing such questions (see for e.g.example, Auld and 
Gulbrandsen, chapter 1112; Dingwerth and Eichinger, chapter 10; and Knox-
Hayes and Levy, chapter 9). 
To sum up, the procedural aims of disclosure include enhancing 
participation or informed choice of recipients, or permitting them to hold 
disclosers accountable—; in a word, empowering recipients of disclosure. As 
such, the question we collectively address relating to procedural effects is 
whether transparency empowers (and if so, whom, and under what 
conditions). 
Substantive effects 
Finally, governance by disclosure aims as well for substantive regulatory 
effects, such as reduced emissions, risk mitigation, and environmental 
improvements (e.g., Fung et al. 2007; Gouldson 2004; Mitchell 1998; Stephan 
2002). A key example is the much-analyzed United States Toxic Release 
Inventory, where an ultimate goal of disclosure is reduced emissions of toxic 
pollutants (e.g., Konar and Cohen 1997). In global environmental governance, 
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these substantive regulatory goals converge on the prevention or mitigation of 
significant transboundary environmental harm or harm to the global commons. 
The link between transparency and environmental improvements 
remains, again, little examined and challenging to assess. This is related to 
long- acknowledged causality challenges hurdles inherent in such assessments. 
It A lack of attention to substantive effects may also, however,  result from a 
more dominant association of transparency with a procedural turn in global 
environmental governance, whereby its empowerment potential (and link to 
informed, accountable, participatory, and legitimate governance) may is often 
be privileged over its role in securing substantive environmental gains (e.g., 
Rose-Ackermann and Halpaap 2002;, see also Gupta 2008). Yet the 
relationship between transparency and environmental improvements is ever- 
more important to assess, insofar as disclosure might be relied upon, more so 
than previously, as an innovative means by which to secure (transboundary) 
environmental improvements in a neoliberal, marketized global governance 
context. 
In line with this, the question we collectively address relating to 
substantive effects is whether transparency improves environmental 
performance (and if so, under what conditions). 
In summary, in assessing effectiveness of governance by disclosure, 
we distinguish between among normative, procedural, and substantive effects, 
and assess whether transparency informs, empowers, and improves 
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environmental performance. In doing so, we advance a final hypothesis (H3) 
here with regard to effects with regard to this third question, one that derives 
from a dominant claim in the transparency literature (e.g., Fung et al. 2007): 
that governance by disclosure transparency is likely to be effective when its 
contexts of application resonate with the goals and decision-making processes 
of both both disclosers and recipients. However, in line with our critical 
transparency studies perspective—one alert to prevailing global configurations 
of political and economic power—we hypothesize that the dominance of 
liberal environmentalism in global environmental governance skews the 
effects of governance by disclosure. We propose  therefore a directional 
version of H3 as well: that in liberal environmentalist contexts, disclosure will 
have minimal market- restricting effects. In comparatively assessing this 
hypothesis, we consider as well whether this is the likely outcome across both 
public and private governance by disclosure initiatives. 
Flowing from the aboveis reasoningTaken as a whole, an overarching 
concern addressed by this volumebookin assessing transparency’s 
effectiveness is the extent to which transparency is transformative (understood 
as the potential of governance by disclosure to inform, empower, and improve 
environmental quality). We leave as an empirical question both the existence 
and the degree of transformation (whether structural or incremental) 




Figure 1.1 below presents an overview of our analytical framework on 
uptake, institutionalization, and effects of governance by disclosure. 
[Insert Figure 1.1 about here] 
We turn next to the diverse cases of governance by disclosure included 
in this volumebook, and conclude with an overview of volumebook 
contributions. 
Governance by Disclosure: The Cases 
Informed by the our analytical framework previously outlined above, the 
contributions to this volumebook explore the uptake, institutionalization, and 
effects of transparency in diverse issue- areas of global environmental 
governance. In selecting the governance by disclosure cases analyzed in this 
volumebookincluded here, we do did not aim for comprehensiveness..   In 
selecting cases for inclusion, ; Instead, we have been guided by the need to 
capture: (a1) the multidirectional demand for governance by disclosure, 
including from public and private actors, and their associated modalities of 
disclosure, such as mandatory versus voluntary disclosure; (b2) diverse 
motivations for disclosure, including a democratization and marketization 
imperative; and (c3) breadth and diversity in the environmental issues 
covered. We focus as a result on five state-led mandatory and five private 
voluntary disclosure initiatives, which vary in who is pushing for disclosure 
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from whom and why. The environmental issues covered include both long-
standing challenges (such as combating deforestation or reducing pesticide 
risks) and newer issues (such as equitable access to and benefit sharing from 
genetic resources, or forest carbon accounting for global climate governance). 
The five state-led mandatory disclosure initiatives included here in this 
book cover some of the most prominent multilateral environmental treaties 
that emphasize transparency as central to their governance aims. These 
include, first and foremost,  the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (henceforth Aarhus cConvention) as a state-led 
multilateral treaty that has been characterized as an extensive experiment in 
“environmental democracy” in a regional and transnational context (Wates 
2005). 
Also included here are two multilateral treaties that rely on the 
governance mechanism of “prior informed consent” (PIC) to regulate 
transboundary flows of risk and harm, as quintessential examples of 
governance by disclosure. These include the Rotterdam Convention on the 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade (henceforth Rotterdam Convention) 
Rotterdam Convention on trade in hazardous chemicals and restricted 
pesticides; and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety regulating trade in 
genetically modified organisms, negotiated under the Convention on 
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Biological Diversity. In both, the aim of disclosure of information is a central 
means by which  is to empower developing countries to exercise informed 
choice in making risk- mitigation decisions,  (with the potential that such 
disclosure about risk and harm may have market-restricting effects). 
Both these treaties build on the earlier Basel Convention on Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal 
(henceforth Basel Convention). This treaty Trade in Hazardous Waste, which 
first introduced prior informed consentPIC the mechanism of informed 
consent as the basis for governing transfers of hazardous wastes between 
developed and developing countries, before finally instituting a ban on such 
transfers (for detailed analyses of the Basel cConvention and its informed 
consent procedure, see Clapp 2001; Krueger 1998; O’Neill 2000). In including 
the Rotterdam and Cartagena treaties in this volumebook, our aim is to extend 
the research agenda on disclosure-based global risk governance, through 
analyzing the pros and cons of relying on information disclosure (as opposed 
to a ban) as the chosen approach in governing global transfers of risky 
substances. 
The final two cases of state-led disclosure included here cover newly 
emerging global environmental governance arrangements. Both are motivated, 
furthermore, and to greater degree than the previous three, by a marketization 
and market- facilitation imperative for disclosure. These include, first, the 
prior informed consentPIC and disclosure of origin negotiations within the 
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Convention on Biological Diversity’s Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Ttheir 
Utilization (henceforth Nagoya Protocol). The second focuses on analyzes the  
transparency-based monitoring, measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) 
systems underpinning one of the newest forest carbon-related climate 
mitigation mechanisms, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries (so-called REDD+), now being negotiated 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). This mechanism is designated REDD+ (reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries).. 
In the latter fourthese cases of state-led disclosure, there is alsoalso  
important diversity in the categories of states demanding and receiving 
disclosure. In the case of the Rotterdam Convention and the Cartagena 
Protocol, those demanding transparency are mostly developing (importing) 
countries seeking information from industrialized (exporting) countries about 
risky substances in international trade,, in order to prevent or mitigate harm 
within their borders. Alternatively, in the case of forest carbon accounting for 
climate mitigation (REDD+), those demanding transparency are developed 
(donor) countries soliciting forest carbon-related disclosure from developing 
countries, to permit performance-based compensation for environmental 
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improvements undertaken by these countries. The Nagoya Protocol, in 
contrast, has a fascinating double-edged state-to-state transparency 
requirement, whereby distinct types of disclosure are required from 
developing countries (as a way to facilitate access of developed countries to 
genetic resources); and from developed countries (as a way to facilitate 
sharing of benefits with developing countries). 
Taken as a whole, the five cases of state-led disclosure initiatives 
included in this volumebook allow assessment of diverse drivers of disclosure, 
along with variation in the categories of states pushing for and receiving 
disclosed information (both developed and developing), in both long-
established and newly emerging global environmental issue- areas. 
Turning next to the five private (and mostly voluntary) disclosure 
initiatives included here, we again cover a diversity of issue- areas, along with 
variation in who is as well as variation in the actors pushing for and 
demanding disclosure from whom. The first two cases analyze corporate 
transparency in global environmental governance, through in-depth analyses 
of the Global Reporting Initiative and the Carbon Disclosure Project. Both 
these entail (voluntary) disclosure about corporate sustainability performance 
from corporations to other interested actors (including other corporations, 
states, civil society, and citizens). 
The additional other cases included here are public-private disclosure 
arrangements, with civil society exercising leadership in them as well. These 
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include the non-state disclosure-based certification schemes of the Forest 
Stewardship Council and the Marine Stewardship Council, whereby the 
imperative driving disclosure is to secure accountability of disclosers, 
informed choice of recipients, and improved environmental performance. Also 
included here are two less -analyzed cases in environmental governance. The 
first is voluntary disclosure in natural resource extraction, through 
comparative assessment of the government-led Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative and the NGO-ledcivil society-led Publish What You 
Pay initiative. The final case assesses disclosure by international 
organizations, with a focus on disclosure relating to the International Finance 
Corporation’s disclosure policies relating to foreign direct investment projects 
in developing countries. 
Table 1.1 provides for an overview of the ten empirical cases covered 
in this volumebook, including who is required to reveal what information to 
whom. 
[Insert Table 1.1 about here] 
Overview of Contributions 
This volumebook is organized in four sections. Part I 1 comprises two broad 
context-setting contributions that supplement this introductory chapter, in 
exploring the nature and dynamics of a transparency turn in global 
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environmental politics. Part II 2 contains the five cases of state-led mandatory 
governance by disclosure initiative; , and Part part III 3 contains the five cases 
of private voluntary and international organization disclosure. Part IV 4 
presents the concluding chapter, which distills comparative insights from the 
preceding contributions, and presents overall findings on transparency’s 
uptake, institutionalization, and effects in global environmental governance. 
Launching our detailed examination, Arthur P. J. Mol discusses in 
chapter 2 the rise of what he terms “informational governance” in an era of 
globalization. He characterizes the transparency turn in global environmental 
governance as having entered a reflexive phase, in which secondary 
transparency i.e., that is, additional layers of transparency provided by 
interpreters and intermediaries, becomes key to making primary disclosure 
actionable. He elaborates on the multidirectional nature of transparency in the 
(global) environmental realm, andIn elaborating on the promise, pitfalls, and 
perils of governance by transparencydisclosure,. Mol concludes that 
transparency has “lost its innocence” as an arbiter of democratic and 
environmental gains, a conceptual and empirical claim to which we return in 
the conclusion. 
In Chapter chapter 3, Ann Florini and Bharath Jairaj present a 
comparative analysis of diverse national contexts shaping uptake, 
institutionalization, and effects of global transparency arrangements. Their 
starting assumption is that global transparency can only acquire meaning only 
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in specific (national and local) contexts. The chapter documents the 
democratization impulse underpinning a global spread of right -to -know and 
freedom -of -information laws, and their institutionalization in the specific 
national contexts of the United States, India, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, 
and China. Even as democratization is identified as a key imperative driving 
uptake of transparency, alternative drivers, such as marketization and 
privatization, are also evident in these contexts. The authors conclude that 
local context matters in institutionalizing and securing desired effects of 
governance by disclosure. These contributions from Mol, and Florini and 
Jairaj, provide additional context for the critical transparency perspective, as 
well asand the analytical framework to assess governance by disclosure, 
outlined in this introduction. 
Part II 2 contains in-depth analyses of As the first of the state-led 
multilaterally negotiated disclosure cases in part 2,. In Chapter chapter 4, 
Michael Mason analyses, in chapter 4, the environmental rights, including the 
“right to environmental information,” laid down in the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention. In historicizing the adoption and functioning of Aarhus 
environmental rights in Europe, Mason demonstrates that an original 
democratization impulse underpinning environmental disclosure, in this case, 
intended to promote the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe, is being 
jeopardized by a concurrent market liberal push for open markets and 
privatization in the region. He shows that the private sector is largely excluded 
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from Aarhus disclosure obligations, ensuring that disclosure has few market- 
restricting effects in this case. 
The critical stance of this chapter on the prospects of transparency to 
effect transformative change permeates the next four contributions as well. In 
Chapter chapter 5, Kees Jansen and Milou Dubois analyze transparency in 
global pesticide governance, through a focus on the Rotterdam Convention on 
the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Tradeand its informed consent procedure. The 
authors consider whether the embrace and institutionalization of “prior 
informed consent”PIC has empowered developing countries to make informed 
choices about imports of risky chemicals. They show that, while although 
disclosure has had certain empowering effects, this is so only if empowerment 
is narrowly understood as enhanced capacities to take make decisions. 
Furthermore, the substantive impact of the Rotterdam Convention is limited 
by the fact that very few chemicals are currently subject to its PIC procedure, 
a result of the geopolitical and material contexts within which these decisions 
are made. 
In Chapter chapter 6, Aarti Gupta also analyses the uptake and 
institutionalization of prior informed consentPIC as a disclosure-based risk 
governance mechanism, this time within the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
regulating safe trade and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The 
chapter analyses analyzes whether the scope and practices of disclosure 
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relating to transgenic crops in agricultural trade further a right to know and 
choose choice of developing countries to permit or restrict such trade. Through 
analyzing the limited disclosure obligations imposed on GMO exporting 
(industrialized) countries by the protocol, Gupta shows that disclosure follows 
rather than shapes market developments in this case, with caveat emptor (let 
the buyer beware) prevailing in practice. As a result, it fails to empower the 
poorest countries most reliant on globally induced disclosure in this case.. 
In Chapter chapter 7, Amandine Orsini, Sebastian Oberthür, and 
Justyna Pożarowska analyze one of the newest disclosure-based global 
governance arrangements: the Nagoya protocol Protocol on access to and 
benefit sharing (ABS) from genetic resources. The chapter documents the 
double-sided transparency requirements (for access to versus benefit sharing) 
now being negotiated within this protocol. The authors show that the 
institutionalization of disclosure for accessing genetic resources (required 
from developing, provider countries) is much further advanced in the Nagoya 
Pprotocol than that for benefit sharing (required from industrialized countries 
and powerful market actors). This outcome results, they argue, from the 
institutionalization of a marketized, decentralized, and bilateral contract-based 
approach to governance by disclosure in this case. 
As the final contribution to Part part II2, Chapter chapter 8 focuses on 
the politics of measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems 
underpinning a the REDD+ climate mitigation mechanism now being 
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negotiated within the UNFCCC: , which calls for compensating developing 
countries for reducing carbon emissions from forest-related activities (so-
called REDD+). The authors, Aarti Gupta, Marjanneke J. Vijge, Esther 
Turnhout, and Till Pistorius, analyze the scope and practices of REDD+ MRV 
systems, including what these systems seek to make transparent, how, and to 
what end. This chapter pinpoints the role of transparency as a means to assess 
and reward environmental performance, in a broader context wherein forest 
carbon has become a valorizable (global) commodity. In so doing, it questions 
who is held to account, and who is empowered, by expert-led, carbon-focused 
REDD+ MRV systems. 
Taken as a whole, these empirical cases of state-led disclosure examine 
transparency’s uptake, institutionalization, and diverse effects. In so doing, 
they shed light, collectively, on how state and non-state authority might be 
reconfigured in such multilateral regimes of transparency, including by 
considering how private actors might shape such public (mandatory) 
disclosure regimes, whether by engaging with or remaining absent from them. 
Part III 3 then shifts attention to voluntary corporate,  and civil 
society–-led, as well as and international organization disclosure, organized 
mostly in voluntary governance arrangements. In Chapter chapter 9, Janelle 
Knox-Hayes and David Levy analyze the rise of corporate disclosure in global 
environmental governance, through a focus on two prominent non-financial 
reporting systems: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Carbon 
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Disclosure Project (CDP). The chapter argues that two competing institutional 
logics underpin the embrace and spread of non-financial disclosure: a logic of 
civil regulation, promoted by civil society actors and intended to secure 
greater corporate accountability; , versus a functionalist corporate logic of 
sustainability management that highlights the instrumental benefits of 
disclosure to company managers, investors, and auditors. The chapter reveals 
how the growing ascendancy of a corporate instrumental logic shapes the 
quality and modalities of carbon and corporate sustainability disclosure. 
In Chapter chapter 10, Klaus Dingwerth and Margot Eichinger focus, 
as well, on the Global Reporting Initiative. They scrutinize the rhetoric, 
policies, and disclosure practices in the GRI, with a specific focus, however, 
on the role of intermediaries in making GRI information actionable. The 
authors show that the GRI’s normatively demanding rhetoric on transparency 
does not permeate the organization’s policies and practices. Moreover, 
disclosed information does not permit comparison across corporate reporting 
entities. They argue, as a result, that transparency is “tamed” in this case, 
insofar as it fails to facilitate holding disclosers to account. However, 
commercial organizations and “for-benefit” groups are now using GRI data to 
produce corporate sustainability ratings. The authors analyze the enhanced 
prospects for empowerment vis-à-vis other effects deriving from the 




Following these cases of corporate voluntary non-financial disclosure, 
the next three chapters in Part part III 3 explore other sources and modalities 
of non-state disclosure. In chapter 11, James Van Alstine focuses on the 
dynamics of transparency in the extractive industry sector and in global energy 
governance. He examines the Extractive Industryies Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) and Publish What You Pay Campaign campaign (PWYP), both of 
which target private actors investing in resource- rich developing countries to 
reveal payments to host governments to exploit oil, gas, and mineral resources. 
Using the specific case of Ghana, Van Alstine highlights the hybrid 
(mandatory/-voluntary) character and rescaling of sovereignty and authority 
that shape transparency’s effects in this case. These effects are mediated, he 
argues, by the challenges to disclosure posed by the unique material qualities 
of oil as compared to other extractive resources. 
In Chapter chapter 12, Graeme Auld and Lars H. Gulbrandsen analyze 
the central role of transparency in the non-state-led certification movement. 
Certification embodies the idea that information disclosure can be a tool for 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), investors, governments, and 
consumers to support high sustainability performers. Auld and Gulbrandsen 
assess this claim by comparing the uptake and effects of transparency in the 
rule--making and auditing processes of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The authors show that the 
MSC uses transparency instrumentally, whereas the FSC treats it more as an 
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end in itself. The chapter thus identifies key differences in how transparency 
contributes to the (perceived) accountability and legitimacy of these two 
prominent certification programs. 
In the final empirical case, Timothy Ehresman and Dimitris Stevis 
examine, in Chapter chapter 13, how the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) deploys disclosure as a way to mitigate negative impacts of foreign 
direct investment projects in developing countries. Their particular concern is 
to scrutinize the link between transparency and environmental justice. The 
authors find that IFC disclosure has only modestly served the cause of 
distributive justice (an original aim of disclosure here), but hold out the hope 
that this effect can be strengthened. 
Taken as a whole, these empirical cases also examine transparency’s 
uptake, institutionalization, and diverse effects in private and public-private 
disclosure initiatives. In so doing, they collectively also shed light on how 
state and non-state authority is being reconfigured by such voluntary regimes 
of transparency, including by assessing how the “shadow of hierarchy” might 
shape the functioning and effects of private voluntary  disclosure. in these 
cases. 
In the concluding Chapter chapter 14, we distil comparative insights 
deriving from the chapters relating to the core elements of our analytical 
framework: Why why transparency now? How is transparency being 
institutionalized? What what effects (normative, procedural, and substantive) 
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does it haveis it having? In addressing these questions, we also assess whether 
the contributions here validate or modify the hypotheses relating to the 
democratization and marketization as drivers of disclosure; , if and how 
disclosure-based governance decenters state-led regulation and opens up 
political space for other actors; , and the conditions under which transparency 
may be transformative. 
Taken as a whole, the volumebook’s findings reaffirm that 
transparency is here to stay, with information disclosure becoming widely 
embraced and institutionalized in diverse ways in multilateral and 
transnational governance of environmental harm and sustainability 
performance. At the same time, our analyses analysis also suggests that claims 
about the “rise and rise” (Raab 2008, 600) of transparency need to be 
tempered by acknowledgment of competing trends that restrict both the uptake 
and the scope of actionable disclosure. 
This volumebook thus documents the many ways in which the 
transparency turn in global environmental governance is evident, but partial. It 
also highlights how the broader (contested) normative context shapes both the 
embrace of transparency by various actors, and its uneven institutionalization 
across diverse areas of global environmental governance. Transparency’s 
effects, we show here, manifest themselves and acquire meaning in very 
specific constellations of power, practice, and authority relationships. While 
Although this may be transparency’s undoing as a broadly transformative 
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force in governance, it does keep alive the hope for emancipatory politics in 
specific instances. Our volumebook makes a start in exploring whether, and 




1. As noted in an article in Harper’s Weekly, December 20, 1913, by US 
Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis (1856–1941). A century hence, this 
remains one of the most famous quotes about the importance of transparency 
in public life. 
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Table 1.1 
Governance by Disclosure in Global Environmental Politics 
 Disclosure about what: 


















Aarhus Convention (disclosure of 






(disclosure of risk assessments, 
regulatory decisions for pesticides 
in trade, export notifications) 
Cartagena Protocol (disclosure of 
risk assessments, regulatory 
decisions for transgenic crops in 
trade, intent to trade) 
Nagoya Protocol (disclosure of 
access requirements; disclosure of 
origin of genetic resources for 
benefit sharing [still being 
negotiated]) 
REDD+ under climate regime 
(disclosure of actions to reduce 
forest carbon emissions; disclosure 
of carbon sequestered in forests; 
disclosure of safeguard 










 Carbon Disclosure Project 
(disclosure of carbon emissions, 
performance, management 
plans) 
Global Reporting Initiative 
(disclosure of corporate 
sustainability performance, 
management plans) 
Forest Stewardship Council 
(disclosure of certification 




Marine Stewardship Council 
(disclosure of certification 
processes and decisions, 
sustainability assessments) 
Corporations 
to States states 
(and 
Publicspublics) 
 Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative 
(disclosure of revenue 
payments/ and contracts) 
Publish What You Pay 
(disclosure of revenue payments 








Corporation (disclosure of 
environmental impacts of foreign 
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